Abstract. With the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the subsequent amendments to RCRA, e orts to provide tighter controls on the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste have been steadily gaining ground. This paper, intended as a decision support tool for regional planning, incorporates information on the hazardous waste generation, treatment capacity and the costs of waste treatment alternatives into an optimization problem of nding the relationship between governing agency and the toxic waste producing rms. As an example, we consider the problem of regional hazardous waste in the San Francisco Bay A r e a i n Northern California.
Introduction
Pollution has been an inevitable accompaniment to economic activities, and as such, most societies have set goals to eliminate, or at least reduce, pollution. It has long been recognized that industries or rms may n o t v oluntarily reduce pollution levels in the absence of any g o vernment compulsory intervention. Such i n tervention can take either of two forms: a) the government can takeover and run some lines of activity, o r b) i t c a n l e a ve the activity t o p r i v ate initiative but regulate it.
Many states generate large amount of hazardous waste for which there is not, at present, adequate treatment and disposal capacity within the state. Federal and state legislation requires that management policies provide for adequate long-term treatment and disposal capacity for such waste. California's policy, for example, calls for meeting treatment requirements by reducing the generation of hazardous waste, with expansion of treatment and disposal capacity only as a secondary solution. Within the state, hazardous waste management planning is also being done at the regional level. Regional governments must project hazardous waste generation and plan for adequate treatment and disposal capacity in their region. Estimates of future waste generation are based on population and economic projections, and then reduced by some percentage across-the-board to account for projected waste reduction.
At present, regional planners do not consider the relationship between treatment capacity, treatment prices and hazardous waste generation. Large o -site treatment facilities o er economies-of-scale provided that the are fully utilized however, if the capacity is larger than anticipated demand then the facility could be forced to increase the unit treatment price which could produce further decrease in demand and price increases. As a result the facility many be be able to recover costs or operate only at higher than projected unit prices. The addition of treatment capacity could also produce other unintended outcomes: low treatment prices could undermine waste minimization e orts or the facility m a y utilize excess capacity b y treating wastes from outside the region.
In order to fully understand the fundamental characteristic of hazardous waste management, we m ust introduce two important agents in the economy: The central authority and the rms. The central authority (CA) is de ned as any a g e n t in the economy which has the authority to regulate the other agents' activity.
We de ne a rm as any organization that, through its activity produces some goods, not necessarily identical, in order to maximize its own pro t. As a by product of the rm's activity, hazardous waste is also generated which needs to be managed.
In this paper, we present an optimization model for hazardous waste capacity planning and treatment facility location. The behavior of private rms is modeled to assess the e ect of central planning decisions and price signals on hazardous waste generation and demand for treatment and disposal. In short, we are mainly concerned with the interaction between the two agents: the CA seeking to regulate the rms in order to maximize the social welfare and the rms responding to these regulations. Furthermore, we have focused our attention on a group of wastes classi ed as incinerable hazardous wastes since it constitute the largest non-nuclear waste group in the US.
The management of incinerable wastes are divided into four major categories: 26 M. AMOUZEGAR AND S. JACOBSEN
Evolution of State and Federal Regulation
Currently there are 11 major environmental laws for controlling di erent t ypes of waste generated throughout the country 42]. One of these laws which concerns hazardous waste, is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 with its \cradle-to-grave" provisions for controlling the storage, transportation, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste. RCRA was signi cantly amended in 1980 and 1984. The 1984 amendment of RCRA, called Hazardous and Solid Waste Act (HSWA) is very important in establishing more stringent standards in waste management strategy. These amendments have restricted untreated hazardous waste from land disposal (\Land Ban") 40] and state laws such as Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1986 (SB1500), which augments the federal Land Ban to include some California-only hazardous wastes. The Land Ban also speci es hazardous waste treatment standards, which for many w astes require that speci c treatment technologies be applied. California law further requires that all hazardous waste containing more than one percent volatile organic compounds or having a heating value of more than 3 000 BTU/lb must either be incinerated or treated by a n equally e ective a p p r o ved process 36]. Planning for hazardous waste treatment and disposal is being done at both the state and county level. Federal law ( C E R CLA x104(c)(9)) requires that states, or a cooperating association of states, prepare Capacity Assurance Plans (CAP) or lose federal funding for Superfund cleanups in the state. Where there is a shortfall of treatment a n d disposal capacity, the state(s) must show that measures are being taken to meet the shortfall. In California, AB650 has required that the Department of Toxic Substances Control prepare such a plan in 1989 and revise it every three years.
Long before the state's rst Capacity Assurance Plan was prepared, the legislature had recognized that additional facilities were needed, but that siting of such facilities was meeting strong opposition at the local level.`Hazardous Waste: Management Plans and Facility Siting Law ' 37] , k n o wn as Tanner Act, provided guidelines and funding for county and regional governments to assess hazardous waste generation within their jurisdiction and to develop waste management plans to guide future policy decisions, including the siting of new treatment facilities. The law also set up a process for evaluating facility siting proposals through a Local Assessment Committee and a state appeals board.
The legislation allows counties to participate in regional associations for hazardous waste management planning. The two principle association are the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), comprised of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano and Sonoma counties, and the Southern California Hazardous Waste Management Authority (SCHWMA), comprised of Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego and Santa Barbara counties. ABAG and SCHWMA account for approximately 25% and 50%, respectively, of all hazardous waste generation in the state. 27 
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A S u r v ey of Pollution Control
A major tenet of this paper is that there are signi cant gaps in our understanding of pollution control and rms' behavior in other than highly abstract economies with full information assumptions. It is important to recognize our limited knowledge about the rms' response to regulatory action by the central authority and even more signi cantly, the lack of complete data on hazardous waste generation and treatment.
In this section, we review past work that can contribute to a better understanding of subsequent sections. Roughly speaking, the literature includes four broad, and sometimes overlapping, topical areas: conceptual models, extensions to the earlier models, e ect of uncertainty and optimization methods.
Conceptual Models
Conceptual models and discussions focusing on e ciency gains of market-base approaches compared with command and control has been discussed by m a n y authors such as Kneese 22] , D a l e 8 ] , Baumol and Oats 4], and Kneese and Schultz 23]. Allen Kneese 22] had the early insights in terms of treating pollution management a s a n economic allocation processes in his work on water pollution. His contribution was to point out that pollution control is not just an engineering problem (which c a n b e solved by technology), or just a political problem, but it is also an economic allocation problem. His prescription was to utilize pigouvian fee (i.e., emission charge), to achieve a socially desirable level of pollution. Following Kneese's work on water pollution, Crocker 7] examined air pollution control as an economic allocation problem. Although his work treats the problem on a very general level, he does introduce the notion of marketable property r i g h t for the use of air resources. Dale 8] expands considerably on the notion of a pollution permit and property rights.
Although these early works introduced most of the ideas used by today's researchers, it is noticeably de cient in the quantitative rigor needed to approach pollution problems.
Extensions
Extensions of these models addressing complications such as space (i.e., multiple regions) and uctuating pollutant disposal. Montgomery 32] and Tietenberg 39] have developed general equilibrium model to examine optimal pollution control focusing on these considerations. Montgomery 32] examines marketable permits to pollute within a spatial economy. His paper is important because it shows that an equilibrium will exist for a marketable permit system such as proposed by Dale 8] .
Susan Rose-Ackerman 34] pointed out a host of practical problems associated with emission fees. Some of her criticism have previously surfaced in terms of general 28 M. AMOUZEGAR AND S. JACOBSEN di culties with the marginalist allocation process. Other perceived problems with emission fees are merely observation on the di culty of controlling pollution and are not unique to economic instrument. Therefore, her criticism do not appear to signi cantly weaken the case for emission fees or marketable permits, a case whose principal interest lies in its alignment of public and private incentives. RoseAckerman suggests two problems: One problems arises when non-constant return to scale apply to either pollution damage or emissions. In such case, marginal cost pricing can lead to nonzero pro t for producer. A r m m a y b e d r i v en out of business, or forced to leave the region, if it is forced to pay the emission fee. But this can be true for any input and there is no indication that economic e ciency is reduced.
A second issue raised by her is the potential ine ciencies associated with an emission fee that is uniform in either space or time. These ine ciencies (relative t o a uniform emission standard) associated with uniform fee depend on the curvature of the cost and bene t functions. But once again, it should be pointed out that fees need not to be uniform.
Finally, Kruppick, et. al. 25 ] examined the marketable permit system for the control of air pollution. In their paper, they allowed for free trade of emission permits subject to the constraint of no violations of the predetermined air quality standard at any receptor points.
E ects of Uncertainty Price vs. Quantity]
A number of authors have i n troduced uncertainty into their analysis and on this basis have shown the optimality of particular control mechanism. Weitzman 45] has shown under what conditions price instrument are preferred to quantity instruments in centrally allocating production and consumption. He con rmed Lerner's conjecture ( 29] ) that under uncertainty, the choice between fee and permits will depends on the slopes of the marginal damage and cost functions. Kolstad 24] explicitly included uncertainty in his empirical model. He examined and compare three regulatory issues: price control vs. quantity c o n trol spatially di erentiated vs. undi erentiated control and command-and-control regulation vs. economic instrument.
Beavis and Dobbs 5] examined the rm behavior under regulatory control with the assumption of stochastic e uent generation. These authors assumed that waste discharge depends on some input and a continuous random variable with a known density function.
Optimization Approach
Many authors have attempted optimization techniques in the pollution abatement problem (e.g., 30], 15], 17], 14]). Graves, et. al. 15 ] used a large scale nonlinear programming in a pollution abatement model for West Fork White River in Indiana in order to minimize the total cost of pollution abatement structure subject to water quality i n e a c h section of the river. Haimes, et. al. 16] and Hass 19] approached the abatement of water pollution through decomposition techniques of Dantzig and Wolfe 9] . Their goal was to simultaneously compute an optimal waste water treatment con guration and to determine optimal pollution taxes to achieve this con guration.
Models of Haime, et. al. 16] and Hass 19] depend crucially upon the assumption that the system is i) centralized, and ii) the centralized system is capable of decentralization. Jacobsen 21] showed that once revenue sensitivities and appropriate bene t measures are introduced, usually both of the above assumptions do not hold. Hall and Jacobsen 17] highlighted the importance of response functions due to speci c regulatory policies. They developed an optimization model based on consumers' surplus, pro t loss, and changes in tax revenues and concluded that, when information costs are too high, it is most e cient to tax the solid wastes directly rather than the tax the goods that produced such w astes.
In most of these models, the solution is derived from a microeconomic approach, in the sense that it is found by locating the point where the marginal treatment cost equals to the marginal damage cost from the perspective of a particular individual polluter (some noted exceptions are Jacobsen 21], Hall and Jacobsen 17], and Kolstad 24] ). However, a serious shortcoming of these models is that complete information on the production and damage cost functions of each a n d every rm is assumed to be known. Although, each rm may k n o w i t s o wn production cost functions, there is no reason to believe that this information will be readily available to the central authority.
Some researcher have conceptualized the problem in terms of a multilevel frame work 1], 19], 16], 24]. Although Hass 19] seemed to realize the existence of two levels, he did not formulate his model as such. Instead, he modeled the problem as a single level and solved it by using Dantzig-Wolfe nonlinear decomposition. Haimes, et. al. 16 ] also recognized the need to consider the problem from a multilevel modeling viewpoint. They proposed a formulation consisting of three level: a central authority, a regional treatment plant, and the individual polluter. Their solution method decomposed the optimization problem into a set of hierarchically ordered subproblems. The solutions of these subproblems were then coordinated to obtain an optimal solution to the original problem. More speci cally, once the central authority determines the tax schedule, it send this information down to the lower levels. The lower levels then process the tax structure and pass results back up to the central authority as optimal treatment l e v els. Using these treatment levels, the central authority c hecks the quality constraints to determine if the previous taxing structure is too high (no binding constraints), too low (some constraint violated), or optimal(no constraints violated, some binding constraint). If the previous tax structure is not optimal, a new tax structure is developed. The iterative nature of this solution technique is necessary since there is no mechanism, inherent in the model, which assumes that central authority has any k n o wledge of the lower level optimization problems. The obvious di culty with such iterative tax setting is that the lower level ( rms) assumes the initial taxes are substantially correct, and they plan their pollution control program which m a y take s e v eral years to complete, and it is largely irreversible once in place. Kolstad 24] formulated his Four Corner case study in terms of a stochastic bilevel problem, but his interest was to derive some empirical properties for various air pollution regulations.
Management o f Hazardous Waste in California
In the 1989 Capacity Assurance Plan, the state established a goal of managing California's waste within the state and limiting exports to 1987 levels. While emphasizing waste minimization and source reduction as the preferred way of managing hazardous waste, the plan saw a need for additional treatment capacity for incineration of liquids, sludges and solids, and projected that several new incineration facilities would be built. However, all proposals for incineration facilities listed in the 1989 and 1992 CAPs as pending have since been withdrawn. Waste exports have increased signi cantly 1 (see Table 1 ), due in part to the lack of in state capacity for treating incinerable waste and a hazardous waste fee structure that encourages out-of-state disposal. The state's 1992 Capacity Assurance Plan emphasizes California's participation in the Western States Regional Agreement on Capacity Assurance, a tacit admission of California's continuing dependence on waste exports.
The state has continued to pursue waste minimization and source reduction as a w ay of balancing waste generation and treatment capacity. Funding is provided for local governments to develop waste minimization programs and to assist small businesses through loans for implementing waste minimization 35]. Hazardous waste generators are required to prepare waste management plans that identify hazardous waste streams and potential source reduction alternatives, formulate a plan for source reduction, and periodically review it 38]. In 1991, the Department of Toxic Substance Control initiated a review of these plans from four industry groups thought to o er the greatest potential for reducing incinerable wastes.
The DTSC promotes waste minimization and source reduction through a series of industry-speci c waste minimization`audit-studies', a w aste recycler's catalog, the California Waste Exchange, and a variety of research and outreach e orts. Many studies, including the department's`Incinerable Hazardous Waste Minimization Project', indicates that large reductions in hazardous waste generation can be achieved by implementing available pollution prevention and waste reduction measures.
Development o f a Decision Support Model
This paper is concerned with developing a model to aid in regional hazardous waste management planning. The model cannot incorporate all the factors that need to be considered in regional waste management planning, such fairness or desirability o f waste treatment v ersus waste reduction. Hence, the model is intended as a support tool to assess the impact of various policy alternatives rather than as a source of nal answers. In section 3.4, we highlighted the fundamental di culties with assuming a complete cooperation between the rms and the Central Authority (CA). It is clear that the major di culty the CA faces, is de ning an objective t h a t w ould increase the social bene t while satisfying the desire of the rms to maximize their pro t. We attempt to take a step toward a more realistic model of an economy where the central authority has control over a subset of decision variables (e.g., prices) and the rms control the other variables (e.g., production).
It is reasonable to assume that the CA has no direct control over such decision variables as source reduction, or amount of on-site recycling. Rather, it can only set certain charges, issue permits, or designate a certain capacity for an o -site facility. This observation split the problem into two: rms and the CA with a hierarchical structure in which a decision maker (CA) at one level of a hierarchy may h a ve an objective function and the decision spaces are determined, in part, by other level ( rms). This leads to a model for the operation of a rm as it relates to waste generation. Given a particular set of prices for o site treatment (including transportation cost, fees and taxes), what is the rm's demand for o site waste treatment?
Risk Assessment
One the most di cult aspect of this decision support model is the assessment of risk and more speci cally quanti cation of risk. In general, emission is caused both by production activities and treatment methods. These emissions are converted by the environment i n to pollution concentration which vary continuously over space and time. Evaluating the damage these pollution concentrations have h a d on human and environment is of particular concern when forming a robust environmental policy. Risk assessment measures both risk acceptance, or appropriate level of safety and risk aversion, or methods of avoiding risk that can be used as alternatives to involuntary exposure. Identifying the risk associated with certain product may 32 M. AMOUZEGAR AND S. JACOBSEN help in forming policies curbing the production or use of such materials. The risk assessment should not stop at measuring only the health and life, such as those resulting in morbidity and premature death, but it should also identify short and long term environmental and economical impact.
The process of risk evaluation for hazardous waste disposal and treatment greatly depends on the technology used and the exposure pathway. In particular, in absence of an alternate technology (e.g., replacing solvent b y w ater-based cleaner) there are many possible point of hazards. We must evaluate the hazard level during and after treatment a s w ell as the possible long run risk to the environment from the disposal of residuals. The treatments and potential hazards points are illustrated in Figure 1 . disability, missed work and expenditures on health. One of the major problems in attempting to answer these questions is the lack of theoretical model specifying the way pollution a ects health. For example, in terms of air pollution, the predominant e ect is more subtle and relates to chronic diseases. Although the principal e ect of air pollution is respiratory diseases, the human body is complex enough so that other chronic diseases, such as heart disease, are aggravated.
An additional di culty is the methodology used in risk assessment. In particular, it has been argued (for example, see 27]) t h a t i n vestigating morbidity is more reasonable than examining mortality since death is the end of a complicated sequence that starts with an initial disease and may evolve i n many ways. Unfortunately, data on morbidity rates, absence rates and health expenditure are not extensively available. There are, of course, other factors such as Urban living, life style, and errors in data collection that contribute to computing a damage function.
Adding to an already di cult problem is the fact that with a few notable exceptions, as in the case of asbestos, the determination of human health hazards must be assessed primarily on the basis of animal studies which are both costly and time consuming. Some speci c sample costs and testing methodologies are presented in a report for the O ce of Pesticides and Toxic Substances 12] .
In our development of a decision support system, we will rely on developing a conceptual damage function that can be set by policy makers according to availability of data. Accordingly let ( ) denote pollution concentration from production, recycling and incineration. Because our only use of pollution concentration information is as an argument in pollution damage function, the speci c nature of is governed by the damage function, ( ). Therefore, if pollution damage is a function of annual average or annual maximum concentration in a region, the can be one dimensional. If, however, is a nonlinear function of concentration at all points in a region or regions over all points in time during a year, the will be a nite approximation to those concentrations.
Hierarchical Decision Making
The central authority, in order to encourage source reduction, may adopt a policy of rewarding rms for each unit of source reduction beyond some lower limit set by t h e C A . A t the same time, the CA desires to punish rms who fail to meet the minimum source reduction standard and for shipping hazardous waste to o site incinerators. The rms, of course, incur other cost other than the penalty (tax) set by the CA. The rms, in planning their waste management policy, need to consider such costs as the onsite recycling cost (including the setup and operating costs) and o site recycling and incineration costs. Notationally, let x iw denote the quantity of waste type w, w = 1 : : : W , r m i, i = 1 : : : I , sends for onsite recycling, and similarly let u iwr and v iwr denote the quantity of o site recycling and incineration of waste type w produced by r m i and shipped to region r, r = 1 : : : R , respectively.
Recycling processes leave certain quantity of residual which need to be incinerated. Let s iw = iw x iw + P r ( wr u iwr + v iwr ) d e n o t e t h e t o t a l w aste w earmarked for incineration by r m i and let L iw denotes the lower bound set by the CA for the waste type w for each r m i. The CA may attempt to encourage the reduction of s iw by setting up a tax/reward system. For example, it may tax each rm for any value of s > 0, or may r e w ard each rm for source reduction by p a ying an amount for each unit of L iw ; s iw . Notationally, let w denote the per unit price CA is paying each rm for reduction of waste type w, and let w denote the per unit tax the CA levies against rms who generate beyond the lower limit set by l a w. It may be that this tax/reward strategy could only be applied to a certain waste type. Let be a set of wastes eligible for tax/reward scheme. 
!
Firms are constrained by the capacity o f e a c h of the facilities available to them, any e n vironmental laws on source reduction, and other physical constraints. In a decision support model, we can assume a xed quantity o f w aste generated at the initial iteration and then revised this quantity t o p l a y di erent scenarios of waste reduction goals. If we denote the initial quantity o f w aste w generated by e a c h r m as q iw then each rm has the following constraint The upper level (the central authority) has its own objective t o optimize. It is conceivable that the central authority m a y wish to minimize the total waste treatment costs and pollution damage cost incurred to the region through the necessity of meeting some predetermined source reduction standard. These costs include both the local(on-site) treatment cost function f( ), regional recycling and treatment cost functions H( ) a n d L( ), respectively and the premium cost p. Thus 
Social Welfare Model
Our second model is to maximize the social welfare of the region and is based partly on Kolstad's ( 24] ) air pollution control model. One way of dealing with social welfare is by the idea of economic surplus for the region. Let's de ne the economic surplus ES, in the absence of environmental regulation as the integral under all inverse demand functions from zero up to consumption level less producers' cost.
whereP i ( ) is the inverse demand function and C i (g i q i ) is the i-th producer's cost with g i and q i = ( q i1 : : : q iW ) denoting the output level and the vector of waste quantity respectively.
The role of the CA is to choose a regulation so that when rms respond to the regulation, social welfare is maximized. One such welfare is de ned as economic surplus (1) less pollution damage. Therefore the CA's objective is to choose a regulation that maximizes welfare. In promulgating a regulation, r, output levels, g(r) and q(r) will be determined by the market in response to the regulation r. Let the pro t function PF for each rm be de ned as revenue minus cost where cost may include regulatory charges. where the value of W is de ned by r indirectly through the optimization problem of the rms (i.e., (L2)).
Consider two t ypes of emission regulations: emission fees and marketable emission permits. We assume both regulations are set before the rms have made their production decisions.
Emission Fee:
We m a y either impose an emission fee on all the hazardous wastes generated or just on those wastes that are send for incineration. (L2) is modi ed to account for the imposition of a fee on all hazardous waste at the source or a fee for lack of source reduction. We m a y s i m ulate the action of a marketable permit system through a constraint on (L2). Let M w be the issuance of emission permits then we m a y append the following to the constraint set of (L2)
Permit trading may be assumed to occur over the entire economy as in equation (5) or trading may occur only within zones (regions).
A B r i e f Note on Centralized Planning
The task of developing a full decision support model requires that we consider the instances where cooperations between the central authority a n d t h e r m s m a y b e possible. Consequently, we present brief descriptions of microeconomic model as well as a system optimization model that may be useful at certain instances of policy making. Our st model considers the problem from the point-of-view of the rms where as before in a g i v en geographical region many rms operate and produce certain amountof goodswhich are not necessarily identical. As a by product these rms' activities a certain quantity of hazardous waste is generated which need to be managed.
Let g, denote the output level of a rm which uses factors of production z 1 : : : z J . Let p j , j = 1 : : : J , denote the per unit price of factor j and let (z) denote the rm's production function, where z = (z 1 : : : z J ). Let P(g) denote the rm's inverse demand function for its product (i.e., P(g) is the per unit price consumers will pay for a total of g units). Let q(z) = ( q 1 (z) : : : q w (z)) where w 2 W denote the vector of resulting hazardous wastes. In this model rms may manage their waste using on-site and o -site facilities, as well as having waste minimization as an additional option. The usual concept of`waste minimization', at its initial state, is that the rm may h a ve a few alternatives with respect to the nature of the very technology that the rm may use to produce its output. We proceed, formally, t o model this important aspect as follows. Let there be T technologies, indexed by t = 1 : : : T , a vailable to the rm and let t , t = 1 : : : T , denote the corresponding production functions. Let t = 1 denote the technology the rm is currently using to produce its output. Assume also that only one technology may be used by the rm. Denote and let T 1t denote the cost of switching from the current technology to another technology denoted by t, t = 2 : : : T . Let q t (z), t = 1 : : : T denote the rm's waste vector when using technology t.
In this conceptual framework, the objective of all rms is to maximize the revenue minus the productions cost, change of technology cost, pollution damage cost and the operating cost (TC). The second model is a s i m p l e system optimization model where the problem is approached from the point-of-view of the central authority. In this area of waste management where there is a total cooperation between rms and the central authority, the CA is in the control of all the location and allocation decisions. This approach will try to minimize the total cost to the system (i.e., minimize
given the capacity constraints for all the on-and o -site facilities. In this model, the optimal solution, if exists, will dictate the behavior of each rm, even though such optimal solution may not be optimal for a particular rm. Therefore, two v ery important questions come to mind, who owns these facilities? And how d o e s t h e CA distribute the costs e ciently? We don't allow the sale of excess capacity b e t ween the rms, so each on-site facility is owned and paid for by the corresponding rm. It is in the o -site facilities where the ownership question arises. One scenario is cooperative ownership by all the users ( rms), another is the ownership by the CA. The third option is a private ownership. In the rst two scenarios, the cost functions are the set-up cost plus the operating cost distributed`e ciently' between the rms. In the latter scenario a closer attention, is needed.
If the o -site facilities are owned privately but are fully controlled by the CA, it would be the same as the CA operating these facilities. Therefore, we m ust assume that after the CA has decided on the size, number and the location of the facilities, it will allow`outside' operation and ownership of these potential facilities through some sort of allocation system such a s m a r k etable permit system. These permits may incorporate two t ypes of operating systems, private (i.e., allow some type of pro t maximization) or public (i.e., zero pro t scheme). Now, whether we employ t h e marginal revenue equal marginal cost rule (pro t maximization), price equal average cost rule under economies-of-scale or price equal marginal cost rule under diseconomies-of-scale (public utility), we are faced with the di culties of computing accurate demands for these o -site facilities, since the o -site cost functions are no longer the set-up cost plus operating cost. The new o -site cost functions are just the per unit prices charged by these facilities. It is immediate that rms' demand for the o -site facilities depends on the o -site prices which in turn depends on the demands by the rms. It is unrealistic and inadvisable for the CA to set arbitrary prices (hence the reason for the bilevel programming model) and then adjust these prices as the o -site facilities respond. The building and planning of such facilities, alone, take y ears and the rms' production decisions may not be so easily changed.
To remedy this cyclical problem, we must assume a full capacity use of each potential facility. We m ust further assume that each facility i s c hosen from a discrete set of facility sizes (an assumption that is more true to reality). We may then compute the per unit prices which maximizes the potential owner's pro t for each facility s i z e .
In the case of public utility, w e set the price equal the average cost under economiesof-scale or price equal the marginal cost under diseconomies-of-scale with a full capacity operation. In the case of a pro t maximizing industry, the CA must have some knowledge of these industries revenue functions. Currently, operating facilities may g i v e some indication of desired pro t margins, or the permit issuing CA may set a ceiling on the pro t margin (e.g., 10% above cost).
If all the cost functions are convex, the problem becomes`trivial' in the sense of Generalized Bender's Decomposition 13] where the decision variables of the constraint set are partitioned into a discrete variable space and the continuous variable space.
The di culty, b e y ond the large size of the problem, is where there is an economiesof-scale in play. It is reasonable to assume that in some of these facilities the marginal cost may decrease as more quantity o f w aste is sent to them which yield a nonconvex optimization problem. The di culty with this type of problem is that current solution techniques may not be able to nd the global (optimal) solution to the problem. The nonconvexity c o m bined with integer variables, which create a discontinuous feasible region, will make the problem even more di cult to solve. Yet, it is exactly this economies-of-scale in the o -site facilities that makes the model more realistic, and in certain cases it is to each rm's bene t to pool their undesirable products together in order to get a`cheaper' per unit cost.
As we have mentioned earlier this model is appropriate when the decisions are centralized. In this model the o -site facilities play the role of the suppliers and the rms have some xed demand. The prices for the o -site facilities depend on the di erent types of ownership scenarios and the bene t function derived from these scenarios. A bene t measure would be the revenue in a private industry, but in a public facility the is measured by adding to the revenue the additional bene t accruing to consumers from receiving a price lower than the maximum they would be willing to pay. In another word the gross bene t to the society is just thè willingness-to-pay'. Let We can mathematically state the bene t to a private and public industries as follows:
For a private enterprise the gross bene ts are from the revenues, thus the private bene t is
2. Social bene t: For a social enterprise, we de ne total bene t as the consumers'`willingness to pay' plus the producers revenue. Suppose for the incremental unit added to a demand of 1 < u and 2 < v , the`willingness-to-pay' is the price P ( 1 2 
Now w e c a n i n troduce a model that considers the bene t to all rms and at the same time regards the pollution damage and the bene ts to the region. It is easy to see that the goal of the CA is to maximize the net bene t, but the di culty i s whose bene t should the CA consider?
It is clear that under any pricing scenario the monetary bene t to the o -site facility is a cost to the rms, and thus the o -site bene ts and the rms' bene ts are not additive. Therefore, our attempt should be to try to maximize the rms' revenue (bene t) minus the on-site, o -site and the pollution damage cost. Of course, the o -site costs are just the per unit prices set by the o -site facilities under di erent o wnership scenarios of equations (6) and (7). 
Application to the San Francisco Bay Area
Our models have been implemented, for a limited set of waste streams (see Appendix A.1), using San Francisco Bay area as a case study. The nine counties of this region, which form the Association of Bay A r e a G o vernments (ABAG), account for over 25% of the waste generated in California. Table 2 shows the total o site disposal of hazardous wastes and current treatment capacity i n e a c h county. The current implementation focuses on incinerable wastes, due to the acute shortage of treatment capacity for them and the limited numb e r o f t r e a t m e n t a n d d i sposal options. The model includes: 20 di erent w aste types, based on California waste codes. Options for waste management are on-and o -site recycling and incineration, plus two disposal options for the residuals. O site facilities in three discrete sizes. Capital and operating costs are given for each t ype and size of facility, based on an EPA studies 10], 1 1 ] Transportation costs are based on mileage, using the distance between the centers of the counties as average distances, and a cost of $0:23/ton-mile. Waste generation data for each waste type in each ABAG county, computed from the`Tanner tapes' of DTSC's Hazardous Waste Information System. Waste generation in each county is divided among small, medium and large rms, with the assumption that they account for 20, 30 and 50%, respectively, of the total generation of each w aste type.
Conceptually, the decision support model will consider the regional hazardous waste problem and depending on the desire of the policy makers and/or the availability of the information partition the problem into centralized or decentralized planning (see Figure 2) . Many solution techniques and commercial softwares are available for the linear or the convex optimization formulations of the centralized planning. Appendix A.2 illustrates an example of a system model using GAMS 6] modeling language. One of the basic results of this model has been the dominance of the transportation costs. Further studies is war ranted and is underway. In case of nonconvex optimization problems (i.e., presence of economies-of-scale in the objective), there are less choices and specialized programs must be developed. For more detailed description of these technique see a monograph by Horst and Tuy 20] .
If it is desired to develop optimal taxing or pricing scheme, we must formulate the problem as a hierarchical model. In the case of the linear upper (i.e., CA) objective and the linear lower (i.e., rms) objective, there are half a dozen algorithms with varying degrees of success (e.g., see Bard . To the best of our knowledge, they can handle about 100 leader variables and 100 follower variables and 50 constraints. When discrete variables are added, the manageable problem size shrinks by nearly an order of magnitude. In case of nonlinear objectives, only a few algorithms exist (e.g., see Vicente and Calamai 44]) but they can only handle small size problems. Naturally, a n y nal analysis depends on the political and physical considerations.
Summary and Remarks
We h a ve d e v eloped a decision support model in order to aid policy makers in developing a sound managerial decision regarding an important issue facing many industrialized nations. This paper gives a brief history of methods developed in the area of environmental economics including recent attempts in using optimization techniques. In this paper, we h a ve recognized the interaction between the central player and the others by d e v eloping a hierarchical model that deals with setting optimal taxing schemes. Issues such a s s o c i a l w elfare, risk assessment and cooperation with rms are also addressed. A single level model (i.e., where the CA controls all decision variables) is implemented in GAMS, a modeling and optimization package which enables a concise algebraic description of complex mathematical programming models. The current implementation contains more than 150 000 continuous variables and 300 binary variables. Due to the size of the problem, a smaller Hierarchical model is implemented using the algorithm developed by Amouzegar and Moshirvaziri 2] . This algorithm has been coded on Matlab using the subroutines developed in 33]. Unlike linear or even integer programming problems where we are able to solve v ery large scale problems, bilevel models need to be scaled down due to their inherent complexities. Hence the development of a decision support system where we are more concerned with a model that can interact with a decision maker. 0  20  50  50  30  30  30  50  100  2  20  0  50  50  30  50  50  30  80  3  50  50  0  30  20  50  80  50  30  4  50  50  30  0  50  80  100  30  30  5  30  30  20  50  0  30  50  60  60  6  30  50  50  80  30  0  30  70  80  7  30  50  80  100  50  30  0  80  140  8  50  30  50  30  60  80  80  0  60  9  100  80  30  30  60  80  140  60 
